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Case No. 990698-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Third 
Judicial District Court granting summary judgment in favor of 
defendant, Ted Hallows, on claims relating to the shooting of 
plaintiffs' dogs. Jurisdiction lies within this Court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) under the order of 
transfer from the Supreme Court of Utah dated October 22, 1999. 
ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Plaintiff Peters' failure to file a statutory notice of 
claim precludes his suit. 
Standard of Review: The filing of a notice of claim is 
governed by statute. "The proper interpretation of a statute is 
*In the notice of claim filed on the Crisman plaintiffs1 
behalf, Mark Crisman is identified as "a 2 year old boy" (R. 22). 
Under Utah R. Civ. P. 17(b), "A minor pr an insane or incompetent 
person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or 
by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the 
court in which the action is pending." No such arrangements have 
been made in this case. 
/ 
a question of law. Therefore, when reviewing an order of 
dismissal involving the interpretation of a statute, [the 
reviewing court] accord[s] no deference to the legal conclusions 
of the district court but review[s] them for correctness." 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
2. The Crisman plaintiffs1 failure to file suit within one year 
of the denial of their notice of claim bars their suit as 
untimely. 
Standard of Review: The statute of limitations governing 
actions following the denial of a notice of claim is likewise a 
question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court is contained 
in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition 
Below 
The complaint in this action (R. 11-1)2 was filed on 
December 24, 1997, by Shari and Mark Crisman and Howard Peters, 
the respective owners of Trooper and Kiva, dogs which were shot 
2The record has been consecutively numbered from back to 
front, meaning each document begins at a higher page number than 
it ends. 
2 
by Mr. Hallows, a state wildlife officer, after they were 
observed chasing deer. The Crismans had previously filed a r 
"Written Notice of Claim for Injury Pursuant to Utah Code Section 
63-30-11" (R. 22-21; quotation from R. 22) based only on the 
death of Trooper. The claim was denied on December 13, 1996 
(R. 17), more than one year prior to the filing of the complaint 
in this action. At no time did plaintiff Peters file a notice of 
claim on his own behalf for injuries to Kiva. 
After suit was filed on December 24, 1997, Mr. Hallows moved 
to dismiss (R. 16-15) on grounds of untimeliness and failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion was 
supported by a memorandum (R. 40-17) attaching Mr. Hallows1 
affidavit (R. 29-25) as well as the Crismans1 notice of claim 
(R. 22-21) and the letter denying it (R. 17). In his reply 
(R. 70-61) to plaintiffs1 responsive memorandum (R. 57-55), Mr. 
Hallows invited the court to treat the motion as one for summary 
judgment based on his submission of materials outside the 
pleadings (R. 69). He also moved the court to stay discovery 
pending a determination on the motion to dismiss (R. 43-41). 
After a hearing, the court entered an order on February 26, 1998, 
dismissing plaintiffs' civil rights cause of action3 but 
otherwise denying the motions to dismiss and to stay discovery, 
ruling that the motion to dismiss turned on the factual question 
of whether Mr. Hallows' actions were taken within the scope of 
his employment (R. 90-89) . After the hearing was scheduled but 
3That ruling has not been challenged on appeal. 
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before it took place, Boyd Kimball Dyer entered his appearance as 
substituted counsel for the Crismans; plaintiff Peters continued 
to represent only himself (R. 87-86) . 
Following denial of his motion to dismiss, Mr. Hallows filed 
his answer (R. 100-92). In October, 1998, he moved for summary 
judgment (R. 109-08), arguing in the supporting memorandum 
(R. 175-10) a lack of jurisdiction based on both the untimeliness 
of the Crismans1 complaint (R. 165-64) and Peters' failure to 
file a notice of claim on his own behalf (R. 164). Plaintiffs 
did not refute--nor could they--the jurisdictional facts on which 
the motion was based. A hearing was held May 17, 1999 (R. 348), 
and the court entered an order granting dismissal on June 21, 
1999 (R. 355-52). Separate, timely notices of appeal were filed 
on July 16, 1999, by the Crismans (R. 358) and plaintiff Peters 
(R. 357). 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The Crisman plaintiffs, mother and minor son (R. 22 and 
143), were the owners of Trooper, a beagle mix dog (R. 142) that 
was sent to stay with Mrs. Crismanfs brother, plaintiff Peters 
(R. 143), in February, 1996 (R. 141). Peters is the owner of 
Kiva, a yellow Labrador retriever (R. 137). 
Defendant, Ted Hallows, a 13-year employee of the Utah 
Division of Wildlife Services (DWR), is the superintendent of a 
fish hatchery operated by DWR in Kamas, Utah (R. 158). On the 
morning of April 24, 1996, he was working outdoors at the 
hatchery when he heard the telephone ring over the loudspeaker 
4 
(R. 152). The caller, Gary Rice, left a message on the answering 
machine that Mr. Hallows retrieved some 15 minutes later 
(R. 151). The message reported that Mr. Rice had observed dogs 
chasing deer on a hillside above the hatchery (R. 151). Mr. 
Hallows then scanned the hillside with binoculars and saw deer 
being pursued by two white dogs (R. 151). 
DWR has a statutory duty to "protect, propagate, manage, 
conserve, and distribute protected wildlife throughout the state" 
(Utah Code Ann. § 23-14-1(2) (a) (1998) . Because the dogs were 
endangering the deer and nearby elk, which were in weakened and 
stressed condition from the harsh winter and their flight through 
deep snow drifts (R. 300), Mr. Hallows retrieved his rifle from 
his nearby home (R. 309, % 12; R. 301, % 42) and watched the dogs 
as they continued their pursuit (R. 3 08, % 15). After Mr. 
Hallows temporarily lost sight of them, the dogs reappeared, and 
he shot them, wounding Kiva and killing Trooper (R. 3 08-07, 
UK 16-19). At all relevant times, Mr. Hallows was on duty and in 
full DWR uniform (R. 303, UK 32-33). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In any action against a government employee taken during 
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or 
under color of law, a written notice of claim must be filed 
within one year after the claim arises. This requirement has 
repeatedly been held jurisdictional. It is clear that plaintiff 
Peters was aware of this requirement, as he filed a notice of 
5 
claim on the Crismans1 behalf on September 14, 1996, well within 
the statutory time limit. However, it is equally clear that he 
failed to file any notice of claim on his own behalf for injuries 
to his dog, Kiva. His default of the notice requirement dooms 
his case. 
While the Crismans filed a timely notice of claim on 
September 14, 1996, it cannot save their case. They failed to 
file their complaint within the one-year statute of limitations < 
measured from the date of the claim's denial. Consequently, the 
district court was without jurisdiction to consider it. 
Even if plaintiffs were able to hurdle these jurisdictional 
obstacles, their case would be defeated on its merits. The 
complaint itself speaks of Mr. Hallows' claim to have acted under 
state code and agency mission statement provisions, bringing the 
case within the scope of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and 
its substantive as well as procedural provisions. At no point 
does plaintiff Peters counter Mr. Hallows' statements that he was 
on duty and in uniform at all relevant times. Plaintiffs' claims 
simply lack the factual support necessary to sustain them. 
Because plaintiffs have shown no error by the district 
court, its decision is entitled to affirmance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF PETERS' CLAIM IS BARRED BY HIS FAILURE TO FILE A 
NOTICE OF CLAIM. 
The district court rendered its favorable decision on Mr. 
6 
i 
Hallows' motion for summary judgment on strictly legal grounds: 
that plaintiffs1 claims were jurisdictionally barred by their 
failure to fulfill the procedural requisites of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. As to plaintiff Peters1 claim, the 
court held: 
Utah Code Section 63-30-12 requires claims against the 
State, based upon acts or omissions of employees while 
acting within the course a[n]d scope of their 
employment, are barred unless a notice of claim is 
filed within one year of the alleged act or omission. 
Peters failed to file a claim within one year of April 
24, 1996 and is therefore barred from bringing the 
present action. 
R. 350. Instead of addressing his default of the notice 
requirement, Peters attempts to bypass it by arguing that a "jury 
could rationally find [Mr. Hallows] was not acting in the course 
of his employment as a fish hatchery supervisor working for the 
Division of Wildlife Resources" (Brief of Aplts. at 12), thereby 
surrendering both the procedural and substantive protections of 
immunity act. In his statement of the case, Peters cites Judge 
Nehring's denial of Mr. Hallows' motion to dismiss on grounds 
that "'it is unclear from the pleadings whether defendant was 
performing his duties as a state employee at the time he shot the 
dogs. Accordingly, Nielsen [sic] v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah 
App. 1994), is not controlling'" (Brief of Aplts. at 4, 1 5). 
Contrary to appellants' portrayal and Judge Nehring's 
conclusion, the issue is squarely on point with this Court's 
decision in Nielson. The Nielson plaintiff attempted to avoid 
the immunity act's notice requirement by representing his action 
as "routine litigation between 'ordinary guys.'" Nielson v. 
7 
Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah App. 1994). Disagreeing, the 
Court explained that Nielsen's argument 
confuses the scope of the notice requirement with the 
extent of substantive sovereign immunity protection. 
Complying with the notice provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional 
requirement and a precondition to suit, and is in no 
way co-extensive with the substantive provisions 
contained within the Governmental Immunity Act which 
insulate the sovereign and its operatives from 
liability. 
Id. at 135. The Court further noted that 
Nielson was aware, even from the initial stages of this 
litigation, that Gurley claimed to have seized his 
property under color of the State's authority. Given 
this knowledge, Nielson will not now be heard to 
complain that the Governmental Immunity Act does not 
apply because Nielson only meant to sue Gurley as an 
ordinary individual, not for anything he did in the 
course of his employment by the State. 
Id. at 134 (footnote omitted). 
The facts in the case at bar compel an equivalent 
conclusion. Both Peters' and the Crismans' claims are similar, 
alleging that Mr. Hallows unlawfully shot their respective dogs 
for chasing deer together in a single course of action. In his 
capacity as the Crismans' legal representative, Peters filed a 
timely notice of claim (R. 22-21) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-11 and -12 (1997), while simultaneously neglecting to 
file one on his own behalf. His complaint explicitly avers that 
"Ted Hallows claims to have shot Trooper and Kiva under color of 
law as required by 'State Code' acting in his capacity as a fish 
hatchery employee for the State of Utah. Ted Hallows claims his 
act was required by and consistent with the 'State's Mission 
8 
Statement1 on conservation" (R. 10, U 10). These facts make 
clear that, like Nielson, Peters knew from the outset of this 
litigation that the defendant claims to have acted in performance 
of his duties, within the scope of his employment, and under 
color of law. Like Nielson, he cannot now be heard to deny the 
immunity act's applicability by arguing that he is suing only on 
the basis of private action. 
Judge Nehring's denial of Mr. Hallows' motion to dismiss 
(R. 90-89) does nothing to change the outcome. The case was 
filed in the Third District Court in and for the State of Utah, 
Summit County, to which judges are routinely assigned on a 
rotating basis. As the case progressed, Judge Nehring, to whom 
the case was originally assigned, was replaced by Judge Brian. 
Under this Court's decision in Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 
884 P.2d 1306, 1311 n.l (Utah App. 1994)," [a] single judge is 
entitled to correct any interim order previously made, and even 
though a location within a judicial district is on a rotating 
judge calendar, the authority of the judge who actually decides 
the case on the merits to correct a previously entered order is 
undiminished." See also Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 439-40 
(Utah 1993) (Orme, J., concurring) ("In a sense, the two judges, 
while different persons, constitute a single judicial office for 
law of the case purposes, namely, the third district judge 
serving Summit County"). 
In short, the issue of whether or not Mr. Hallows was 
ultimately within the scope of the immunity act's substantive 
9 
protection does not alter plaintiffs1 duty to comply with the 
act's procedural requisites. Plaintiff Peters knew that a notice 
of claim was required, as demonstrated by his filing of a notice 
on the Crismans' behalf and by his reference in the complaint to 
Mr. Hallows' claim of statutory and agency authority. Peters' 
default of notice is not excused by recasting his action as a 
private one. Consequently, the court's dismissal of Peters' 
claim was correct and is entitled to this Court's affirmance. 
II. THE CRISMANS' CLAIM WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED AS UNTIMELY. 
Unlike plaintiff Peters, the Crismans filed a timely notice 
of claim for the death of their dog, Trooper (R. 22-21). The 
claim was denied on December 13, 1996 (R. 17). Under the 
governmental immunity act, the Crismans had one year following 
the denial in order to file suit: "The claimant shall begin the 
action within one year after denial of the claim or within one 
year after the denial period specified in this chapter has 
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to 
the claim is characterized as governmental." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-15(2) (1997). The complaint in this case was filed on 
December 24, 1997, 11 days beyond the one-year statute of 
limitations. Even plaintiffs admit this fact: "The claim was 
denied on December 13, 1996. This was more than a year before 
the date the action was filed, December 24, 1997" (Brief of 
Aplts. at 3; citation to record omitted). Their admission 
acknowledges the correctness of the district court's conclusion: 
Utah Code Section 63-30-15(2) requires that a civil 
action must be filed within one year following the 
10 
denial of the claimant's notice of claim. Since the 
Crismans did not file their civil action within one 
year after the notice of claim was denied, they are 
barred from bringing this action. 
R. 350. 
Instead of addressing this jurisdictional flaw, the Crismans 
choose to ignore it and move directly to the merits of their 
claim. However, because of the absence of jurisdiction, the 
district court did not reach the merits. Its order as to the 
Crismans' claim was based entirely on the bar erected by the 
complaint's untimeliness (R. 350). The Crismans* admission of 
the underlying facts leaves this Court without grounds for the 
reversal they seek. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF IS INADEQUATE TO ATTACK THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Even if the Court were to look beyond the dispositive 
jurisdictional issues, plaintiffs' brief is inadequate to raise 
an issue as to the district court's findings of fact. It is 
well-established that in challenging a court's findings of fact, 
an appellant "may not simply reargue its position based on 
selective excerpts of evidence presented to the trial court." 
Promax Development Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 
1997). Instead, the appellant "must marshal all the evidence 
supporting the court's findings and then show that even viewing 
the evidence and inferences in a light most favorable to the 
decision, the marshaled evidence is legally insufficient to 
support those findings." Kunz & Co. v. State, Dep't of Transp., 
949 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah App. 1997). Indeed, "appellate counsel 
11 
must play the devil's advocate." Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah App. 
1994). As this court has stated, "[S]elective citation to the 
record does not begin to marshal the evidence; it is nothing more 
than an attempt to reargue the case before this court--a tactic 
that we reject." Id. at 1053. 
Plaintiffs in this case argue that there is a genuine issue 
of material fact regarding whether Mr. Hallows was acting within 
the scope of his employment. Instead of marshaling the evidence, 
they rely solely on the assertion contained in plaintiff Peters' 
second affidavit, filed April 30, 1999, that Mr. Hallows 
allegedly "admitted that they [sic] he had shot the dogs because 
they had disturbed his garden and bothered his horses" (R. 342, 
% 41)--an accusation that does not surface until fully 16 months 
after the filing of the complaint, on the eve of the May 17, 1999 
summary judgment hearing, and is not corroborated by any other 
evidence of record. It is significant that no mention of this 
alleged admission is contained either in Peters' first affidavit, 
dated some five-and-a-half months prior, nor in plaintiffs' 10-
page "Proffer of Oral Argument" submitted to the court on January 
20, 1999 (R. 230-21) .4 In fact, Peters' late-breaking assertion 
stands in direct contradiction to the allegations of the 
complaint: "Ted Hallows did not shoot the dogs in defense of any 
livestock, domestic animals, household pets[,] persons or 
4The "Proffer of Oral Argument" has no evidentiary value but 
is simply one attorney's interpretation of events. 
12 
personal property" (R. 9, 1 14). Since plaintiff Peters drafted 
the complaint, his omission of such an inculpatory declaration 
from the factual background of the case, as well as from his 
first affidavit and the plaintiffs' proffer of argument, shows 
the statement from his second affidavit to be no more than a 
scintilla of evidence insufficient to preclude summary judgment 
in Mr. Hallows' favor. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs summary 
judgments. It is substantively identical to Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In interpreting the state rule 
where the federal analogue is substantively identical, the court 
"'freely refer [s] to authorities which have interpreted the 
federal rule." Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah 
App. 1992) (quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick 
Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 1990) (citations 
omitted)). Under the federal rule, it is firmly established that 
"the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the 
plaintiff's position will be insufficient . . ."to preclude 
summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 
252 (1986). 
Even taken in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Mr. 
Hallows' alleged admission constitutes no more than an indication 
of subjective intent. Whatever his subjective motivation, Mr. 
Hallows cannot be held liable for objective conduct that comports 
with governing law. 
Plaintiffs' claim that Mr. Hallowi "has told three different 
13 
stories of the shooting" (Brief of Aplts. at 14) gives no 
citation to the record for the "story" that he shot the dogs for 
disturbing his garden and horses. An examination of the record 
reveals the only support for this proposition to be the scintilla 
of evidence in plaintiff Peters1 second affidavit, which does no 
more than put uncorroborated words into Mr. Hallows' mouth. 
Moreover, plaintiffs have failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting the court's finding that "Hallows was acting within 
the scope of his employment when he shot the dogs on April 24, 
1996" (R. 350). The record discloses that three persons in 
addition to Mr. Hallows observed the dogs chasing protected 
wildlife on the day of the shooting: Gary Rice, a resident of 
the area (R. 134-31); Tommy Thompson, another area resident 
(R. 129-27); and Dana Dewey, a DWR employee (R. 125-22). It is 
uncontroverted that Mr. Hallows was on duty and in uniform on 
April 24, 1996, when he followed up on a telephone call from Gary 
Rice regarding wildlife being pursued by dogs (R. 303, HH 32-33). 
Neither the Crismans (R. 139) nor Peters (R. 214, H 10) was 
present when the dogs were shot; consequently, they have no 
direct, personal knowledge of whether deer or elk were present at 
that time. John F. Kimball, Jr., DWR director, testified by 
affidavit that 
[t]he DRW is statutorily mandated to protect the 
state's wildlife in trust for all citizens of the State 
of Utah. The Utah Code § 23-14-1(2) (a) provides in 
pertinent part: "....[t]he DWR shall protect, 
propagate, manage, conserve, and distribute protected 
wildlife throughout the state." Accordingly, the 
mission statement ("mission") and policy of DWR is to 
protect and help conserve and propagate all protected 
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wildlife and to take appropriate legal action to 
achieve these goals. 
R. 295, H 7. He further testified that based on the affidavits 
submitted in the case, he was able to conclude that Mr. Hallows 
had acted within the parameters of his employment as a fish 
hatchery employee when he shot the dogs (R. 291, UK 14-15; 
R. 289-88, m 20 and 24-26; R. 286-85, 1 37). 
Coloring the facts with pure conjecture yields plaintiffs no 
better result. In their statement of facts, for example, 
plaintiffs relate that when Peters arrived home from work on the 
day of the shooting, he checked the dog penfs fences and found 
them secured in a different manner than they allegedly had been 
when he left that morning (Brief of Aplts. at 11). However, 
there is no evidence tying any act of plaintiff to this asserted 
condition. While plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of 
reasonable inferences from the evidence of record, they are not 
entitled to the court's indulgence of idle speculation. "Such 
speculation falls short of creating a genuine issue of material 
fact sufficient to survive summary judgment." Gildea v. Guardian 
Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 (Utah 1998). 
Mr. Hallows' conduct, as evidenced by the facts of record, 
is within both the scope of DWR policy and the protection of 
statute, which the complaint explicitly acknowledges that Mr. 
Hallows pointed out when plaintiff Peters initially confronted 
him (R. 10, % 10). While the question of scope of employment is 
ordinarily one of fact, "when the employee's activity is so 
clearly within or outside the scope of employment that reasonable 
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minds cannot differ, the court may decide the issue as a matter 
of law." Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994). 
Here, the evidence so clearly demonstrates that Mr. Hallows was 
within the scope of his employment that the court correctly 
determined the issue as a matter of law, and the scintilla of 
evidence to the contrary fails to provide a. basis on which 
reasonable minds could conclude otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs in this case neglected to follow the procedural 
strictures of the governmental immunity act. Plaintiff Peters 
did not file a notice of claim at any time. The Crismans 
submitted a timely notice of claim, but failed to file their 
complaint within one year of the claim's denial as required by 
statute. These defaults are, by themselves, sufficient grounds 
for affirmance of summary judgment in Mr. Hallows' favor. But 
even if the merits in this case were reached, reasonable minds 
could not differ in concluding that Mr. Hallows' actions were 
taken within the scope of his employment. For these reasons, as 
more fully explained above, defendant, Ted Hallows, respectfully 
requests the Court to affirm the judgment of the district court. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Defendant believes the law is sufficiently clear with 
respect to the issues in this case that neither oral argument nor 
published opinion is necessary. If, however, the Court elects to 
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order oral argument, defendant wishes to participate 
/ / / J // 
NANCY1L. KEMP 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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